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B I R D S  AND AIRPORTS 
ERWIN W. PEARSON, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and W i l d l i f e ,  W i l d l i f e  Research Center, Denver, 
Colorado 
INTRODUCTION 
      For a l l  practical purposes, research in t h i s  country on the problem of b i r d  hazards to 
aircraft began in 1960 with the crash of an Electra turboprop that carried 62 people to 
their deaths and was attributed to ingestion of starlings into the engines.  In t h i s  paper 
I intend to review the problem and present some of the answers found by investigators in 
t h i s  country and, to lesser extent, abroad.  The discussion w i l l  be roughly divided into 
two parts:  1) what: causes the problem, when, and where; and 2) what has been and is being 
done at a i r f i e l d s  to reduce it.  Dr. Seubert of the Patuxent W i l d l i f e  Research Center des- 
cribed the problem in Europe at this conference 3 years ago, so I w i l l  try to bring you up 
to date on the problem here. 
      We at the Denver W i l d l i f e  Research Center have been actively engaged in few specific 
studies at a i r f i e l d s .   Although we m a i l e d  a questionnaire to airport managers at 190 in- 
s t a l l a t i o n s  in the 22 mainland states west of the M i s s i s s i p p i  River in 1961 and made follow- 
up personal v i s i t s  to 25 commercial and m i l i t a r y  a i r f i e l d s  at seasons of the year when most 
problems had reportedly occurred, it appeared that none would l a s t  long enough for us to 
undertake studies.  Since then we have attempted primarily to solve crop depredation, feed 
lot, and roost problems w i t h  the idea that knowledge obtained from them could be adapted 
and applied to b i r d  hazard problems as they arose at a i r f i e l d s .  
THE PROBLEM 
      To begin w i t h ,  there have been at least four airplane crashes r e s u l t i n g  in human 
deaths that authorities blame on b i r d s ,  p l u s  a few others involving total losses of a i r -  
craft:  1) On October 4, 1960, the crash I mentioned previously, when 62 people were k i l l e d  
in an Electra turboprop, occurred at Logan Airport in Boston.  It was attributed directly 
to three of the four engines continually ingesting starlings for several seconds during the 
c r i t i c a l  power requirement period just after the loaded plane had l e f t  the ground on take- 
off (Anonymous, 1962 a).  2) On November 23, 1962, a Viscount turboprop crashed 10 m i l e s  
southwest of Baltimore, k i l l i n g  a l l  17 persons aboard after a whistling swan (perhaps two) 
h i t  the left horizontal s t a b i l i z e r  at an a l t i t u d e  of about 6,000 feet (Anonymous, 1962 b). 
3) In March 1963, the p i l o t  and s i n g l e  passenger of a private single-engine plane were k i l l -  
ed in C a l i f o r n i a  when a common loon struck the t a i l  assembly at an unknown altitude, the 
airframe f a i l e d ,  and the plane crashed (Seubert, 1965).  4) On October 3 1 ,  1964, an astro- 
naut in a jet trainer was k i l l e d  in Texas when a snow goose apparently collided with the 
cockpit canopy at low a l t i t u d e ,  causing the p i l o t  to lose control and crash (Anonymous, 
1962). 
      These four cases are the extreme part of the problem—losses of human l i v e s .   Much 
l e s s  p u b l i c i z e d ,  naturally, but much more common—and extremely expensive—is the cost of 
repairing engines, wings, w i n d s h i e l d s ,  nose section, radomes, t a i l  assemblies, landing gear, 
etc., as well as the cost of ferrying expensive aircraft to repair bases and the loss of 
revenue w h i l e  they are out of service. These amount to several m i l l i o n  dollars a year to 
commercial a i r l i n e s  and the m i l i t a r y .  An idea of the extent comes from A i r  Force b i r d -  
plane s t r i k e  reports for 1965.  For that year only, a l l  strikes were reported, regardless 
of the amount of damage.  The total number was 839, or nearly s i x  times the number reported 
the previous year.  These and other records indicate that A i r  Force bird-plane strikes are 
increasing and that damages may total "perhaps $10 m i l l i o n  a year" (Anonymous, 1966), 
(They a l s o  indicate that a large number of strikes are not normally reported because the 
damage happens to be s l i g h t . )  
As an example of the k i n d  of expenses involved, a report from an a i r f i e l d  in the west- 
ern U n i t e d  States estimated that damage of $75,000 resulted when an owl was ingested into 
a large jet engine.  The engine was severely damaged, as were three t i r e s  and wheels during 
the deceleration process, because the takeoff was aborted and the p i l o t  braked to a stop 
near the end of the runway. The original cost of such a jet engine was over $220,000 in 
1961 (Neff, et a l ,  1962), and is probably more now. Another report estimated $6,000 in 
damage to the covering and inner wing structures of a twin-engine piston a i r c r a f t  that h i t  
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a flock of geese. Reports by aircraft maintenance personnel on wing damage from b i r d  
strikes have l i s t e d  $500 plus 15 hours out of service for a DC-8, $1,250 and 57 hours out 
of service for a DC-6B, and $2,000 for a Constellation (no out-of-service time given) 
(Pearson and Neff, 1963). 
These examples w i l l  give you some background information to refer to as you look at 
Tables 1-5 and Figure 1.  In looking at these tables and figure, you w i l l  notice that the 
data are not new; more recent figures by other workers support these data so closely that 
I used our own figures as examples. These show strike data for the period May 1962 to mid- 
October 1963 as reported by p i l o t s  and maintenance personnel of commercial a i r l i n e s  (Pear- 
son and Neff, 1963; Pearson, 1964).  For t h i s  period, compilations were made at Denver, 
but a l l  subsequent reports were diverted to Patuxent for analysis, and these most recent 
data are not included in t h i s  paper. 
Most of the tables are self-explanatory, but data obtained from strike reports have 
some l i m i t a t i o n s .  For example, Table I shows that at least nine engines, a l l  on large, 
four-engine jets, had to be changed before the aircraft could f l y  again; yet of these nine, 
only one, the $75,000 estimate previously mentioned, was included in a report, and even 
there the time out of service was not given. Thus even though about one-third of the re- 
ports gave cost estimates, these included no more than one-ninth of the most expensive dam- 
age item—jet engine changes and repairs—and none included engine changes or repairs in 
the time-out-of-service category. Another item not included was the expense required to 
ferry damaged aircraft to their "home bases" for repair, although there were s i x  of these 
occurrences during the 2 years we compiled data at Denver.  Therefore, it is obvious that 
the data in Table 4 cannot be c a l l e d  a proper sample and projected to give total cost or 
out-of-service estimates. 
Figure 1 shows that, w h i l e  we d i d  not receive strike data for a f u l l  year, most s t r i k e s  
occurred in the spring and f a l l  migration periods, and especially in the f a l l  when b i r d  pop- 
ulations, flocking tendencies, and migrational movements are at their peaks. Of the 11 
known strikes by waterfowl from May 1962 to early March 1963, a l l  but one—when a m a l l a r d  
duck was h i t  on J u l y  9 at an a l t i t u d e  of 21,000 feet over Nevada (Manville, 1962)—occurred 
during the f a l l  migration period between the m i d d l e  of September and early December. 
S t r i k e  data also indicate that a large proportion of strikes (43%) occur on or near the 
ground (Table 2), and most of these are near a i r f i e l d s  where controls are possible.  B i r d  
strikes above 500 feet are probably unavoidable and would be unaffected by any presently 
a v a i l a b l e  form of control.  Solving bird hazard problems to prevent ingestion or other dam- 
age at these higher a l t i t u d e s  w i l l  depend upon changes in aircraft configurations and engine 
designs, and information from my few contacts w i t h  people q u a l i f i e d  to know indicates that 
satisfactory changes w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t ,  perhaps impossible to develop. 
Geographical areas where most b i r d  strikes occur are roughly indicated by the 46 
strikes at coastal and 94 strikes at i n l a n d  c i t i e s  (Pearson, 1964). Although d i f f i c u l t  to 
weight properly, Seubert's data C1963) have categorized numbers of strikes according to 
numbers of a i r  carrier operations at airports where they occurred.  This appears to offer 
the best data available, and indicates that, in general, more strikes per 10,000 aircraft 
operations occur at coastal c i t i e s  than i n l a n d ;  it also pinpoints certain a i r f i e l d s  where 
the greatest b i r d  hazards seem to exist i n l a n d . 
The species of birds most often involved In strikes further c l a r i f y  problem areas. 
Our data (Table 3) identify 26 kinds of b i r d s  struck from May 1962 to mid-October 1963, 
and Seubert (1963, 1965) l i s t e d  49 species from April 1, 1962, to June 30, 1964, many of 
them i d e n t i f i e d  from b i r d  fragments sent to the National Museum in Washington. Our 1962-63 
data (Table 3) show that g u l l s ,  waterfowl, and pheasants made up 58% of the 103 reports 
that l i s t e d  the species involved. Seubert (1965) shows these three types of birds contin- 
ued to lead the l i s t  in the same order during 1964. 
Bird-plane strike data, for the most part, compare closely w i t h  information from ques- 
tionnaires completed by airport managers in 1961 (Neff and Pearson, 1962). Of the 73 man- 
agers reporting known or potential b i r d  hazards at some time during the year, 34 (47%) 
l i s t e d  g u l l s  as a problem species; 11 of these were from i n l a n d  airports far from a sea- 
coast, but w i t h i n  reasonable distances of rivers, lakes, or impoundments. Waterfowl were 
a problem at 18 locations (25%), s t a r l i n g s  at 1 1 ,  and "blackbirds" at 9 others.  Four of 
the starling and blackbird problems were reportedly caused by the birds' activities at 
nearby roosts and four by daytime feeding. 
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In December 1966, I m a i l e d  questionnaires to 2 1 5  managers of airports in the western 
United States, i n c l u d i n g  the 190 canvassed in 1961 p l u s  25 more that we had missed or that 
could recently have begun operations by turboprop or jet aircraft.  The questionnaires re- 
turned so far may i n d i c a t e  that b i r d  hazards are increasing.  In 1961, questionnaires re- 
turned in the f i r s t  54 days after m a i l i n g  showed known or potential hazards at 62 (53%) of 
the 1 1 8  a i r f i e l d s  reporting; in 1966, returns from 1 1 9  a i r f i e l d s  in the f i r s t  54 days show- 
ed known or potential hazards at 73 (6l%. G u l l s  were again at the top of the problem l i s t  
being reported at 43, or 59%, of the 73 airports; next came s t a r l i n g s  at 28 (38%), water- 
fowl at 15 (21%), and blackbirds at 13 (18%).  These are s i m i l a r  to the 1961 data, except 
that the positions of waterfowl and s t a r l i n g s  are reversed.  In reports by p i l o t s  and main- 
tenance personnel of actual bird-plane strikes, pheasants were the t h i r d  most numerous spe- 
c i e s  h i t ,  but they were l i s t e d  in f i f t h  place by airport managers in the 1966 questionnaires. 
To summarize, from a l l  sources of data presented here, it appears that g u l l s ,  waterfowl, 
pheasants, s t a r l i n g s ,  blackbirds, and pigeons, in that order, are the principal problem 
species. 
PRESENT CONTROL METHODS 
Data presented so far have indicated where and when b i r d  problems occur and the p r i n c i -  
pal species involved. Now l e t  us look at methods used to reduce b i r d  problems in airport 
environments. 
The 1966 questionnaires were designed p r i m a r i l y  to determine what has been done at 
western airports.  The results are encouraging, and are summarized in Table 5.  Although 
bird-plane strikes appear to be increasing, airport managers are increasingly aware of the 
problems involved, and many are doing something about i t .  
Habitat manipulation is a f a m i l i a r  term to the w i l d l i f e r ,  who manages habitat to i n -  
crease the game y i e l d  of h i s  lands, but to the airport manager it should have the opposite 
meaning.  The airport environment must be changed, not to please people, but to displease 
b i r d s —enough so that they w i l l  go elsewhere to nest and r a i s e  t h e i r  young, feed and loaf, 
or stop for awhile on their migrations. Trees, shrubs, brush, and weeds must be removed 
because they provide cover for roosting, nesting, preening, and protection from weather and 
natural enemies, and because many produce seeds or berries or harbor insects that are foods 
for b i r d s .   Grass should be kept mowed to a height of k or 5 inches—any longer and it w i l l  
provide cover for ground-nesting species of birds and cover for mice and rabbits, which in 
turn w i l l  attract hawks and owls; any shorter and it w i l l  provide excellent areas for such 
b i r d s  as g u l l s ,  s t a r l i n g s ,  robins, blackbirds, and others to search for seeds, worms, and 
insects.  Ponds and ditches should be drained or otherwise eliminated, and these and other 
low spots should be leveled so that they w i l l  not act as catch basins for water during 
rainy periods.  In short, airports should be managed to become biological deserts so that 
they w i l l  not provide a s i n g l e  requirement for the d a i l y ,  seasonal, or annual a c t i v i t i e s  of 
any species of b i r d .  
This is a general description of the ideal airport environment if the goal is to d i s -  
please birds, but achieving it takes time and money.  Therefore, other forms of control 
must be used, at least temporarily, or in many areas, permanently.  Many control methods 
are being used at airports, but not to the extent they could be.  Broadcast distress c a l l s  
have proved useful, and combining them w i t h  a shotgun and two-shot shel1 crackers, or occa- 
s i o n a l l y  l i v e  ammunition, is acknowledge in t h i s  country (Seubert, 1963), Canada ( B i r d ,  
1965), and abroad (Seubert, 1964 to be one of the best control methods a v a i l a b l e .   In gen- 
e r a l ,  the use of two or more s t i m u l i  has produced better results than one alone.  Carbide 
exploders a l s o  have t h e i r  place as a control measure, particularly where waterfowl are a 
problem.  F a l l  hunting seasons are "open seasons" on migrating ducks and geese at airports, 
where already jumpy b i r d s  are u s u a l l y  e a s i l y  dispersed by exploders set in open f i e l d s  or 
on shores of ponds or ditches and moved occasionally.  Revolving or moving l i g h t s  also help 
in waterfowl problem areas. 
In Canada, the p o s s i b i l i t y  of u s i n g  dogs to keep b i r d s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  g u l l s ,  on the 
move, was investigated, then dropped because of numerous d i f f i c u l t i e s  ( B i r d ,  1965).  Pere- 
g r i n e  falcons were t r i e d  over a 2-year period at two airports having g u l l  problems in Can- 
ada.  However, falcons are s t r i c t l y  daytime operators, and because of nighttime problems as 
well as periods of l i m i t e d  v i s i b i l i t y ,  h i g h  cost, d i f f i c u l t i e s  of t r a i n i n g ,  and suscepti- 
b i l i t y  to disease and loss, p l u s  other considerations, t h i s  project was dropped, even though 
it was successful in many respects ( B i r d ,  1965). 
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Other aspects of the problem being investigated by the Canadians include: the possi- 
b i l i t y  of using microwaves projected ahead of the aircraft that w i l l  temporarily disorient 
birds and cause them to drop from the flight path; decompression chamber tests to determine 
how high birds can f l y ;  and development of test "birds" of the proper size, weiqht, and 
composition for impact tests to produce aircraft designs best suited to resist b i r d  damage 
(Bird, 1965). 
In t h i s  country considerable research is underway to f i n d  practical b i r d  reproduction 
inhibitors, biological controls, and chemical agents that can be adapted to control speci- 
f i c  b i r d  species.  Traps are already in use in Canada (Bird, 1965) and at two western a i r -  
ports in t h i s  country (Table 5), to reduce local b i r d  populations.  In both countries, stud- 
ies have been in progress for about 3 years to detect and forecast movements of b i r d s  
through the widespread use of radar (Seubert, 1966; B i r d ,  1965). B i r d  states, " I t  is hoped 
that eventually, through international cooperation, b i r d  reports w i l l  be passed north and 
south from one airport to another to indicate the movements of such h i g h  hazard birds as 
geese and swans." 
It must be obvious by t h i s  time that a great deal of information has been gathered by 
many people concerning the b i r d  hazard problem, and that controls are a v a i l a b l e  and studies 
are searching for others.  It seems that the next major steps to be taken are to coordinate 
efforts and to develop methods to implement findings in specific airport problem areas. 
The most ambitious, and by far the most practical, solution to the problem of starting 
a permanent program to reduce hazards was evolved by the Canadians. Alarms over the b i r d  
problem had been sounded by several groups for about 2 years when the Department of Trans- 
port asked the National Research Council to look into the matter in the autumn of 1962. A 
National Research Council Associate Committee on B i r d  Hazards to Aircraft was formed w i t h  
M. S. Kuhring as Chairman.  In the words of Mr. Kuhring, "The members of the Associate Com- 
mittee were chosen so that the various agencies involved with birds would be represented 
and the individuals were selected on the basis of what they could contribute to the work." 
This very effective group includes four representatives from the Canadian W i l d l i f e  Service, 
three from the National Research Council, and one each from the Royal Canadian A i r  Force, 
Department of Transport, A i r  Canada (a major a i r l i n e ) ,  Canadian Pacific A i r  Lines Limited, 
Rolls-Royce of Canada Limited (representing the aircraft industry), and the Canadian Aero- 
nautics and Space Institute—13 members in a l l  (Kuhring, 1965).  Since the Canadian Depart- 
ment of Transport operates most of the airports, their member on the committee makes possi- 
b l e  direct and effective communications to the f i e l d  (Bird, 1965). 
An international symposium on the bird-airport problem was held in Nice, France, in 
November 1963 and attended by about 70 persons from 10 countries. One of the most impor- 
tant recommendations made was that national committees be formed by a l l  countries so that 
cooperation could be arranged on an international basis. Shortly after the symposium, na- 
tional committees were formed in Germany and New Zealand. The Netherlands had already set 
up an informal but close-working group including a b i o l o g i s t  and representatives from the 
c i v i l  a i r l i n e  and the m i l i t a r y  (Kuhring, 1965).  In t h i s  country an interagency committee 
held i t s  f i r s t  meeting in September 1966, and included representatives from the Departments 
of Interior and Health, Education, and Welfare, as well as the Federal Aviation Agency, 
C i v i l  Aeronautics Board, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, A i r  Force, Army, 
and Navy (Seubert, personal communication, January 1967). The FAA was the agency p r i m a r i l y  
responsible for formation of this committee and is acting as coordinator for the group. 
Members are presently forming research p r i o r i t i e s  for submission to the FAA in the areas 
of ecological research, airport b i r d  management, and radar surveillance of migratory b i r d s .  
The FAA has indicated that the programs to be i n i t i a t e d  w i l l  be given h i g h  priority for 
action (Seubert, personal communication, February 1967). 
To repeat in summary, it appears that the problem and some of the solutions have been 
sufficiently documented for work to begin at any problem a i r f i e l d  in t h i s  country. Studies 
have been underway for several years at some of our eastern a i r f i e l d s ,  but we should now 
attempt to alleviate problems on a coordinated, nation-wide b a s i s . 
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TABLE 1.  BIRD-PLANE STRIKE DATA COMPILED AT DENVER WRC. MAY 1962 TO MID-OCTOBER 1963 
 
TABLE 2. ALTITUDES OF B I R D  STRIKES 
 
TABLE 3.  SPECIES OF BIRDS INVOLVED IN STRIKES, 1962-1963 
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T A B L E  4 .   E S T I M A T E S  O F  C O S T  A N D  T I M E  O U T  O F  S E R V I C E  F R O M  3 6 7  B I R O - P L A N E  S T R I K E S ,  A S  R E P O R T -  
E D  B Y  A I R L I N E S  P E R S O N N E L ,  1 9 6 2 - 1 9 6 3 _______________________________________________  
N u m b e r  i n d i c a t i n g  t a n g i b l e  d a m a g e  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  1 4 6 
N u m b e r  l i s t i n g  c o s t  e s t i m a t e s  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  5 1  
T o t a l  e s t i m a t e d  d a m a g e  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   $ 9 3 , 2 0 1  
N u m b e r  l i s t i n g  t i m e  o u t  o f  s e r v i c e  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 4  
T o t a l  h o u r s  e s t i m a t e d  o u t  o f  s e r v i c e  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - 3 5 4 - 3 / 4  
TABLE 5.  B I R D  CONTROLS USED AT AIRPORTS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES _________________  
Control method No. airports 
A. Habitat manipulations to reduce attraction to b i r d s 
1. F i l l e d  or drained ponds (55.5 acres) 9 
2. Cut trees, bushes, hedgerows, weeds (6,153 acres) 36 
3. Cut grass to 3-5 inches (25,001 acres) 51 
4.  Dumps: moved 11 
covered immediately 10 
burned immediately 3 
s t i l l  problems (on adjacent property) 3 
5. Other: cattails cut and roost dispersed 1 
pheasants hunted 1 
soil "sterilized" (to reduce insects) 1 
B. Controls used 
1. Tower radio warning of birds in area 32 
"Air advisory" (written) 1 
2. Patrols: year around 8 
spring and/or fall migrations 12 
durin g bad weather, as needed (mostly for gulls) 7 
3. Shotguns                                 . 24 
4. Shell crackers 10 
5. Exploding devices (exploders and firecrackers) 5 
6. Distress calls 5 
7. Sirens or horns 3 
8. Trapping (starlings and pigeons) 2 
9. "Poisons" or chemical treatments 8 
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